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“Everything Around Here Belongs to the Kolkhoz, Everything
Around Here is Mine”1 –
Collectivism and Egalitarianism: A Red Thread Through Russian History?
PETER LINDNER and ALEKSANDR NIKULIN
Introduction
One of the peculiarities of Russian
history in the 20th century is that it
can be interpreted as the history of
fundamental change as well as one of
straightforward development. It re-
quires only a slight shift of perspective
to emphasize either the stability of
cultural foundations that are not only
concordant with the principles of the
October revolution but actually have
to be understood as one of the reasons
that brought it about, or to see a
historic break, leading to an entirely
new political, economic, and social
order. The more the continuity of a
process that has its roots in the
persistence of cultural norms and
traditions is highlighted, the more
likely it seems that the problems of
transformation after the dissolution of
the Soviet Union have to be traced
back to exactly the same cultural
norms and traditions.
“Egalitarianism” and “collectivism”
are the decisive catch-words that
constitute this continuity and pervade
the history of rural Russia, the prerev-
olutionary land communes,2 and the
Soviet collective farms. They set up a
framework that gives meaning to
singular sociohistorical incidents by
identifying same common roots and
weaves a red thread through Russian
history: For example, that in Soviet
times a person was very rarely exclud-
ed from a collective farm because of
misbehaviour, although the legal regu-
lations provided for this; that in the
presidential elections of 1996, a dis-
proportionately high percentage of
inhabitants of rural areas voted for
Gennadij Zjuganov, the candidate of
the communist party; or that after
1991, only very few workers of collec-
tive farms were willing to start indi-
vidual farming – all these events can
now be ordered around an identical
interpretative centre. Egalitarianism
and collectivism are its key notions
and the subjects of a long-lasting
academic discourse that produces
“peasant icons,”3 which can subse-
quently become part of the self-
identification of those whom they
originally described (KOTSONIS 1999,
p. 11).
It is this threefold explanatory
power – the suggestion of continuity,
the provision of a readily available
framework for the interpretation of
single events, and the use as a pattern
for self-identification – that permits,
in my view, the characterisation of
“egalitarianism” and “collectivism” as
a “meta-narrative” of the history of
rural Russia. Consequently, the term
should first be understood as a reflec-
tion of the fact that concepts such as
these always bear the potential for
reification (YANEY 1985, p. 33) rather
than an overall judgement about a
“right” or “wrong” depiction of reali-
ty.4 In short: They possess the power to
influence attitudes towards the past,
interpretations of the present, and
politics for the future. How liberal
reformers in Russia saw the collective
farms and respectively tried to priva-
tise and reorganise them after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union is a
good example of this.
The aim of this article is to break
up the notions “egalitarianism” and
“collectivism” and thereby the idea of
continuity in the history of rural
Russia by asking to which social
norms, institutions, and practices they
usually refer. We agree with SMITH
(1989, p. 338), that studies of the
socialist world, in particular, necessi-
tate a refocusing of our “regional
lens”, the paying of “due attention to
those socio-economic and political
processes which make places differ-
ent”. This is notably true for rural
Russia and the village communities
before as well as after 1917 and we
therefore put special emphasis on
territories and places, and the degree
of their autonomy with regard to their
integration into broader economic
and political environments.
The first part of this paper provides
a short outline of how the understand-
ing of rural Russia is shaped by a
variety of texts that are different in all
respects – in theoretical and method-
ological approach as well as empirical
foundation – except in their emphasis
on egalitarianism and/or collectivism.
It would be a challenge for an
“Archaeology of Knowledge” (FOU-
CAULT 1972) to correlate these works,
trace some main lines of argument,
unveil common references and recur-
rent contexts, and point to hidden
contradictions and the mechanisms of
their incorporation. But, given the
limited space here, only a fairly
selective number of examples must
suffice to characterise some key focus-
es of this meta-narrative. By focussing
on their territorial moorings and their
relationships to the outside world, the
second and third section then explore
the different ways in which collectiv-
1 Refrain of the famous Soviet song “Dorožnaja” by
S. A. Vasil’ev (text) and I. Dunaev (melody), written
in 1947.
2 In the following we use “village community” (mir)
as a general term, “land commune” (obščina) to
emphasize the periodic redistribution of land in vil-
lage communities, and “rural society” (sel’skoe
obščestvo) for the administrative body of self-go-
vernment created in the reforms of 1861.
3 Although we agree in general with FRIERSON’s (1993)
innovative work on “Peasant Icons: Representati-
ons of Rural People in Late Nineteenth-Century
Russia,” we differ with her inference that the icon
of the “communal peasant” was a “failed image”
that “did not effectively contest the image of the
rational peasant” (FRIERSON 1993, p. 6, 115).
4 However, we frankly admit that the notion “meta-
narrative” and consequently the purpose of this
paper remain somewhat ambivalent between a pure
depiction of an interpretative framework and a more
critical analysis of a reality-shaping image or even
a mere stereotype. It is not by accident that a simi-
lar ambivalence holds true for SAID’s analysis of the
orientalist discourse: On the one hand, his “project
has been to describe a particular system of ideas,
not by any means to displace the system with a
new one” (SAID 1995, p. 325) but, on the other, it
contains the momentum of critique, unveiling the
ideological content of the prevailing images and
calling for alternatives.
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ism and egalitarianism as practices of
everyday life were embedded in chang-
ing structural frameworks. As a van-
tage point for comparison, we take
the time after the emancipation stat-
ute of 1861 and the Brezhnev period,
because both preceded state attempts
to overcome collectivism (the Stolypin
reforms of 1906 and Gorbachev’s
perestroika) and therefore stimulated
new debates among scholars. Again,
there is no place here to account for
differences, for instance, between
regions or the status of peasants
(crown peasants, state peasants, land-
lord peasants), which are, without
any doubt, of enormous importance.
We conclude that collectivism and
egalitarianism might not be the wrong
denotations when used in specific
contexts, but it is exactly these
changing contexts that define their
meaning, and consequently they can
not be used as evidence for cultural
continuity in rural Russia.
Collectivism and egalitarianism:
Meanings and contexts
A discursive superelevation of the
egalitarian character of rural Russia
has a long standing history. As early as
the first half of the 19th century, the
so-called “Slavophiles” emphasized the
high valuation of the community in
the land communes as the central trait
of the Slavic people. They traced its
cultural roots back to an unspoiled
agrarian society and argued that “the
Russian finds his real, genuine, the old
Russian, slavic, pre-Petrinien culture
in the countryside, its bearer is the
peasant” (MASARYK 1913, p. 214).
August Haxthausen, the famous trav-
eller and researcher by order of the
later Prussian king Friedrich Wilhelm
IV, had characterised this society using
the notions of “equality,” “family
community” and “patriarchy”. Gradu-
ally the aspect of patriarchy had faded
out in most depictions and, instead,
equality was highlighted and regarded
thereby as a foundation for historical
processes but not as their possible
outcome or content (GOEHRKE 1964, p.
37). The fascination with the prerevo-
lutionary land communes, which ex-
tended far beyond the inner circles of
the Slavophiles, was essentially nur-
tured by this image of an equal and
just rural society and received a highly
moral undercurrent as it was juxta-
posed to western liberalism, capital-
ism, and social Darwinism (FRIERSON
1993, p. 10, 101ff.): “We are not
burgeois, we are peasants … we are
poor in towns and rich in villages” as
Alexander HERZEN in 1856 put this
moral superiority in an introductory
article for his almanac “Polar Star”
(HERZEN 1856, p. VII). In this context,
it is not surprising that obščina, the
Russian word for the land commune,
which emphasizes primarily the equal
distribution of fields but is often used
as a synonym for village communities
(mir) in general, was invented within
a scholarly discourse and was rarely
used among the villagers themselves
(GRANT 1976).
The prominent position that the
land communes held in public discus-
sions as well as on the political
agenda in the 19th century forced
Marxism, too, to deal with this topic,
namely with the question of whether
the land communes could be directly
transformed into the “higher form of
communist property” (MALE 1963, p.
234). MARX and ENGELS themselves
addressed this issue in the foreword to
the Russian edition of the Communist
Manifesto of 1882 and stated: “If the
Russian revolution becomes the signal
for a proletarian revolution in the
West so that both complement one
another, then the Russian collective
property in land can be the vantage
point for a communist development”
(MARX a. ENGELS 159, p. 576). Lenin’s
approach was at once much more
ambivalent and pragmatic, acknowl-
edging that the land communes were
an important part of the “rural condi-
tion” and necessitated concessions like
those made after his death in the land
decree of 1928 (KINGSTON-MANN 1983,
passim). It was not until nearly a
century later that Emmanuel TODD
attributed to rural collectivism and
egalitarianism an exactly inverse but
much more central role in the imple-
mentation of communism. He sees
them not as potentials that could have
helped to implement the new order,
but as the very reasons for its fast
acceptance in Eastern Europe: Com-
munism for him is the result of the
“transference to the party state of the
moral traits and the regulatory mech-
anisms of the exogamous community
family” (TODD 1988, p. 33), which is
characterised by equality between
brothers (and authority of the head of
a household).
The Slavophile position might be
regarded as too essentialist, the Marx-
ist as too pragmatic (in practice) and
ideological (in theory), and TODD’s
structuralism as too far from the
realities of everyday life to allow for a
more detailed analysis of the concrete
routines and practices to which collec-
tivism and egalitarianism as theoreti-
cal concepts refer. But this is certainly
not true for an impressive number of
recent publications that can be as-
signed to the loose framework of the
“new paradigm in the study of the
Russian peasantry” (PALLOT 1999, p.
15; see also KINGSTON-MANN 1991).
1. These works are, first, character-
ised by a focus on the traditions,
norms and rules that governed
peasants’ everyday life at the turn
of the century. They try to stay as
empirical as the available sources
allow and aim to understand peas-
ants’ behaviour within its own
rationality. And they put high
emphasis on the peculiarities of
the times, regions, and contexts of
their subject. Collectivism and egal-
itarianism, although still prevalent
in many of these works, lose their
character here as an underlying
attribute of peasant culture and
become meaningful strategies for
making allowances for the de-
mands of a peasant economy as
well as balancing them with the
changing challenges of the outside
world. To give a few illustrative
examples, PALLOT analyses, how
“peasant attachment to collectiv-
ism” (1999, p. 249) translated into
specific responses to the Stolypin
reforms and those among the
villagers who were willing to leave
the commune. FRANK (1987) and
WOROBEC (1985, 1987) show the
extent to which peasants’ custom-
ary law and popular justice were
based on a differentiation between
community members and outsiders
and point out, that how popular
justice was exercised tended to
reinforce the inner coherence of
the commune. FIGES takes the
communal ploughed land as a
vantage point to shed more light
on the “deeper sense of collective
well-being and mutual responsibil-
ity” (1986, p. 95) than does the
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prevailing concentration on the
redistribution of land. And ATKIN-
SON (1990) directly addresses the
question of how peasants’ ideas of
justice and equality are rooted in
an understanding that deduces the
right to land from the willingness
and ability to work it.
2. Second, most of these works build
on the assumption of the existence
of a separate peasant world (COX
2002, p. 574; PALLOT 1999, p. 15), a
“microcosm dominated by local
interests” (MIRONOV 1985, p. 458), a
divide between “peasant and offi-
cial culture” (FRANK 1987, p. 265)
and the “relative insularity of the
Russian village” (WOROBEC 1991, p.
22), on “peasant particularism”
(SEREGNY 1991, p. 341), “regional
loyalities” (JOHNSON 1990, p. 90)
and a “local society” with “local
activities” and a predominant rep-
resentation of “local interests of
the village“ (ALTRICHTER 1984, p.
100). But these and many other
similar formulations suggest a con-
sensus, which, in fact, does not
exist. They draw to a varying
degree on spatial metaphors that
serve to express three quite differ-
ent aspects or concerns:
• A rejection of all kinds of
universalist approaches, namely
the subjection of their subject
matter to the framework of
Marxist or modernisation theory.
• An emphasis of the distinctive
implications of agrarian liveli-
hoods, often explicitly referring
to the work of SCOTT and de-
scribing them as a “moral econo-
my” (1976), the members of
which had to rely on the “weap-
ons of the weak” (1985).
• A highlighting of the fact that
rural areas consisted, in the eyes
of their inhabitants, of a mosaic
of distinctive units in the form of
land communes, each of which
defines a separate sociospatial
lifeworld for its members.
It is in the second and third of
these concerns that the concepts of
collectivism and egalitarianism are
inextricably moored in a spatial
construction of identity, building
on the assumptions of highly loca-
lised economies and territorially
disjointed village communities in
rural areas.
The establishment of a socialist polit-
ical system in Russia, then, provided
for an entirely new point of departure.
On the one hand, empirically founded
research was, with some remarkable
exceptions, such as HUMPHREY (1983),
not possible for western researchers,
and Soviet scientists worked mainly
with different methodological ap-
proaches on different topics. On the
other hand, egalitarianism and collec-
tivism were now a central element of
the official ideology and were there-
fore supposed to have become an
integral part of Soviet culture after 70
years, especially in rural areas (LEVA-
DA 1993, p. 66ff.). Some authors who
worked extensively on the prerevolu-
tionary land communes regard this as
only the formalisation of what was
popular culture before the revolution.
“Popularly seen as a war against all
privilege” argues, for example, FIGES
(2002, p. 437) “the practical ideology
of the Russian Revolution owed less
to Marx – whose works were hardly
known by the semi-literate masses –
than to the egalitarian customs and
utopian yearnings of the peasantry”.
Following this argument, what looks
like Bolshevism is merely the “expres-
sion of the traditional social relation-
ships of the Russian society like the
collectivist tradition of Russian rural
culture” (STUDER a. UNFRIED 1999,
p. 90).
But more important, the highlight-
ing of continuity in Russian history
was considerably strengthened after it
turned out that the privatisation of the
collective farms met with much more
resistance in rural areas than many
had expected.5 This is most clearly
expressed by WEGREN (1994, p. 218f.),
who has probably published, in the
last ten years, more than anybody else
in the West on the privatisation of
Russian agriculture and is worth
quoting at length: “… in order to
understand the manner in which land
reform is unfolding, ... it is necessary
to refer to previous cultural norms
from the Soviet and pre-revolutionary
past in Russia. … Awareness of
cultural continuities allows us to
understand why there has been no
mass decollectivisation in the Russian
countryside, despite some predictions
in the West” – subsequent sections of
his article are then entitled “collectiv-
ism” and “rural egalitarianism”. The
title of a later publication (WEGREN
2000) poses the problems through the
accusing question “Where is the Rural
Elite?” and adds the thesis of a much
too egalitarian legislation from ‘above’,
thereby blaming the difficulties of
agrarian transformation in general on
a vicious circle of cultural norms and
legislative framework.
Egalitarianism and collectivism, the
positive antithesis to Western capital-
ism in the 19th century had now
become highly pejorative notions
which shaped post-Soviet agrarian
politics. The government under Presi-
dent Yeltsin, not incidentally using
prerevolutionary comparisons, saw the
collective farms as “semi-feudal enti-
ties” resistant to any form of restruc-
turing (NICKOLSKY 1998, p. 204),6 but it
is even more indicative that the
Stolypin reforms of 1906, which aimed
to break up the land communes, were
discussed as a possible blueprint for
privatisation nearly a century later
(MACEY 1993, p. 98)! Reformist plan-
ners waited for the collectives to
collapse and disappear (HUMPHREY
2002, p. 169), and the World Bank,
together with the Moscow Agrarian
Institute, worked out a model scheme
for the privatisation of collective
farms that clearly aimed not only at
privatising but, beyond that, at split-
ting up the existing collectives (LER-
MAN 2001).7 Reports about hostilities
against private farmers, stretching
from general scepticism over ostra-
cism and theft (VAN ATTA 1993, p. 87),
to burning haystacks and tractors
(HIVON 1995, p. 18, 1998, passim) fitted
only too well in this picture of an
irrationally collectivist rural popula-
5 In July 1993, the then minister of agriculture Vik-
tor Chlystun predicted euphorically the establish-
ment of 600,000 - 650,000 private farms with an
average of 75 ha land each, amounting to 20 % of
Russia’s agricultural land by the end of 1995 (CRAU-
MER 1994, p. 339f.). In fact, in 1995, only 279,000
farms with an average size of 43 ha had been es-
tablished (Goskomstat Rossii 2003, p. 410).
6 “Feudal” itself is another widespread characteri-
sation of the post-Soviet Russian countryside,
which evokes the association of timeless continui-
ty. In fact, it is in most cases used only to empha-
sise a highly unequal distribution of power, although
some draw much further parallels (GAMBOLD MILLER
2003).
7 This scheme was published as a “privatisation
manual” (International Finance Corporation/The
Overseas Development Administration 1995) in Rus-
sian and English with a print run of more than 25,000
issues and distributed free to all collective farms in
Russia.
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tion that punished any kind of ‘indi-
vidualistic’ behaviour. Compared to
these clear-cut statements, it is often
quite vague, which social practices are
included under the labels collectivism
and egalitarianism in prerevolutionary
and Soviet times.
The prerevolutionary land commu-
nes: Balancing local needs and
external demands
“No one was ever born v obshchine
[in the land commune] but rather v
derevne [in the village]” (LEWIN 1990,
p. 21). This statement points to the
important fact that the land com-
munes8 were first and foremost a
territorially defined entity and not
any kind of spatially dispersed social
network although one notable excep-
tion began to gain in importance after
the abolishment of serfdom in 1861:
The migrants who lived in the cities,
but who often still owned land in the
communes and sent money back to
their families, depending even in the
cities on relationships of zemljačestvo9
(BURDS 1991; JOHNSON 1990). The most
important manifestation of this terri-
torial identity – or at least the one
that received the most attention in
academic discourse – was the periodic
redistribution of land among its mem-
bers, using families, male workers, or
‘eaters’ as a basis for calculation.
Although it was a response to the fact
that the commune as a whole was
responsible for fulfilling its tax obliga-
tion (krugovaja poruka), the redistri-
bution of land and the equal appor-
tionment of property among male
heirs became widely-used points of
reference for their presumed egalitar-
ianism and collectivism. As some
authors argue, although the practice
of redistribution had been established
for mainly pragmatic reasons it subse-
quently contributed to the “emer-
gence of egalitarian ideas among the
Russian peasantry” (MOON 1999, p.
220).
The periodic redistribution of land
probably illustrates more clearly than
any other function of the land com-
munes their dual character: On the
one hand, they had to serve the
purposes of the landlords and the
state, and on the other they constitut-
ed an institution of local self-govern-
ment for the village communities.
They had to pay their taxes to the
landlords, a sometimes quite heavy
burden, as BOHAC (1991) impressively
demonstrates, but beyond that, they
had considerable freedom to regulate
local affairs autonomously. This dual-
ism made them a “mediator” and
“broker” (BURDS 1991, p. 52) between
local needs and external demands, an
institution that shaped “locales” (GID-
DENS 1995, p. 169f.) to a great extent
by regulating their relationships with
the outside world. This facet is rarely
adequately acknowledged. We do by
no means suggest that putting the
focus on this aspect of the village
communities opens up an entirely
new interpretative framework. But it
adds an additional perspective that
highlights changes in the character of
these communities and, at the same
time, the nature of their presumed
egalitarianism and collectivism.
Informal social control as a mecha-
nism to maintain effective order is a
common feature of small, localised
communities all over the world (al-
though it might work quite differently
in different places) and played a huge
role in Russian villages before and
after the revolution, too. But beyond
that, the land communes and their
regular meetings (schod) gave the
village communities an institutiona-
lised forum for the negotiation of
interests with clearly defined roles,
rights, responsibilities, and procedures.
The head of each household (bol’šak)
had the right to vote in the meetings,
which elected an “elder of the estate”
(starosta), usually for three years, and
often also representatives for other
functions, such as tax collectors or
guards. High emphasis was put on the
unanimity of decisions and, after long
discussions, could lead to the post-
ponement to a later time of controver-
sial questions (ZYRJANOV 1992, p. 30).
Surely, the land communes were far
from an ideal democratic institution.
Widows were, for example, excluded
from the assemblies, villagers without
land were admitted only when their
immediate concerns were discussed
(KUCHUMOVA 1981, p. 337), and richer
peasants tended to have an inordi-
nately high influence (MACEY 1990, p.
222).10 But they provided for a quite
high degree of publicity for the
processes of decision making.
The main issues dealt with in the
assemblies were the repartition of
land and the distribution of tax
burdens among the households. Be-
cause the character of repartitional
land – after 1861 often seen as the
ideal type of communal property –
turns out to be trickier than it seems
at first glance (LEWIN 1985, p. 9), it is
highly doubtful that the land com-
munes really prohibited the develop-
ment of “individualistic and absolute
notions of property rights” as MACEY
(1990, p. 222) suggests. Except for
juridical reasons, this was true be-
cause the period between general
redistributions could often be longer
than 10 years (PALLOT 1982, p. 16),
investment in apportioned land, such
as manuring, was rewarded in subse-
quent redistributions (WOROBEC 1990,
p. 96), and the farmstead as well as the
land around it (usad’ba) were usually
held in hereditary tenure. Other func-
tions of the commune, for instance the
control of the adherence to an agreed
crop rotation or the allocation of land
for farmsteads to new households,
might have affected private property
rights in one way or another, but did
not suspend them entirely by submis-
sion to communal control.11
The status of the land communes as
a mediator and broker was consider-
ably strengthened by the reforms of
1861. When Alexander II launched the
emancipation legislation, he was quite
aware that this posed the problem of
establishing a new administrative re-
gime in rural areas and he opted for
the introduction of peasant self-gov-
ernment to save the state the expense
8 There is no place here for a general description
of the land communes, their history, and internal
structures. For a very condensed overview with
references to further readings, see EKLOF (1981) and
MIRONOV (1985).
9 Zemljačestvo refers to friendly relations among
zemljaki, persons from one’s native village or regi-
on (BURDS 1991, p. 92; JOHNSON 1990, p. 91). For
BURDS, migration became such an important factor
for the peasant economy that it necessitated a
change in the conception of “community”, genera-
ting a “third culture” (BURDS 1991, p. 53, 55).
10 Local self-government is also often criticised for
being corrupt (PERASON 1989, p. 21ff.), although dis-
tinctions are necessary here: Many reports refer to
the volost’-level, the higher unit of self-government
where relationships were far less personal and
mechanisms of social control much weaker.
11 An additional important duty before the introduc-
tion of an universal military service in 1874 that
was also – like the collection of taxes – imposed
on the commune by external authorities and invol-
ved a lot of bargaining among villagers, was filling
the local quota of recruits for the army.
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of providing bureaucratic supervisors
for peasant communities (PEARSON
1989, p. 22). The newly created “rural
societies” (sel’skoe obščestvo; some-
times referred to as “village societies”
or “village communities”) did not
always coincide territorially with the
land communes, which posed many
administrative problems in the follow-
ing decades. But, in most cases, the
existing institutions took over the new
duties, which meant, de facto, that
many of the former rights and respon-
sibilities of the landlords were trans-
ferred to the land communes (ATKIN-
SON 1983, p. 22ff.). The elected repre-
sentatives of the communes became
members of higher-level administra-
tive organs (zemstvo and volost’) and
were, in return, responsible for the
proper observance of the new laws in
their villages. Duties, such as the
maintenance of the infrastructure in
the villages and some welfare func-
tions were now officially handed over
to the rural societies.
This legal-administrative situation
set up a structural framework in which
concrete practices of collectivism and
egalitarianism were always embed-
ded. “Neither the zemstva nor the
government can help the people if
they do not work and care for
themselves” (quoted in FIGES 1986, p.
91) as one councillor at the time put it
– and the commune was quite aware
of that. Because they were collectively
responsible for the fulfilment of exter-
nal duties, in most cases any preferen-
tial access to the scarce local resourc-
es for one peasant would have meant
disadvantages for all the others. When
the commune tended to heavily con-
trol the acquisition of additional in-
come from external sources (e. g. from
labour migration to the cities), this
was done not to keep to an abstract
ideal of egalitarianism, but rather to
avoid for its members additional
burdens which could have originated
from absenteeism and abandonment
of land. The measures taken ranged, in
this case, from the levying of a
“departure fee” and annual payments,
to refusal to issue the necessary
passport, and the seizure of the
property of the migrant (BURDS 1991,
p. 66ff.). But there seem to have been
no general efforts to avoid economic
stratification.12 Another example that
represents a deep inroad into private
property rights was communal inter-
ference in traditional patterns of
property devolution. But here, too, the
reason was that it was necessary to
maintain self-supporting, tax-paying
households because of the commonly
imposed tax obligations (WOROBEC
1991, p. 42ff.). In still other cases,
communal activities were not as tight-
ly bound to demands from the state or
the landlords as was the case with
taxes and military service. But they
were usually also based on the need to
share the burden for commonly used
goods or infrastructure that otherwise
simply would not have been available:
To ploughing a part of the land
communally was widespread at the
end of the 19th century, and, except
for paying taxes, the revenues were
used for building grain stores, main-
taining the school and the church, or
supporting widows and orphans (FIG-
ES 1986).
Most of the activities that rein-
forced communal identity were not
decided from a “higher authority”
within the commune but involved
permanent processes of forming opin-
ions and bargaining. The communal
assembly was merely the formal organ
that had finally to reach a decision,
but it relied heavily on local “public
opinion” (MIRONOV 1985, p. 444). That
processes of bargaining characterised
the relationship with the landlord, his
representatives, or state officials, too,
is shown by BOHAC (1991), who tracks
these negotiations in great detail for
the Manuilovo estate in the Tver
province between 1810 and 1843. In a
reciprocal process in which the com-
mune played the role of a mediator,
the local public developed its shared
understanding of and position towards
the outside world. The pool of com-
mon resources, common responsibili-
ties, and a social institution essentially
based on common participation made
for the origin of what could be called
a localised discursive formation, which
was “public” in every sense of the
word. It developed its own notions of
“right” and “wrong”, which were im-
pressively displayed in the sometimes
cruel practices of peasant self-justice
(samosud). The appliance of different
standards for insiders and outsiders
(FRANK 1987, p. 241; WOROBEC 1987, p.
290) and the conviction that offences
that threatened the agrarian basis of
subsistence, such as horse theft, were
not sufficiently punished by official
law (FRANK 1987, p. 264; WOROBEC
1987, p. 282) can be interpreted as
expressions of that.
Although the end of the 19th
century was surely a time of profound
changes for the land communes, they
kept many of their basic characteris-
tics, at least until the eve of the
Stolypin reforms of 1906; collectivism
and egalitarianism as social practices
of everyday life remained embedded
in local public discourses that arose in
response to a considerable degree of
autonomy in meeting the require-
ments of high external demands on the
one hand, and of a strongly localised
economy on the other. These four
aspects determined their very mean-
ing and changed dramatically after
the integration of the Russian coun-
tryside into the Soviet system.
“Vremja zastoja” – Time of the
standstill: A double standard system
at its height13
“Everything around here belongs to
the kolkhoz, everything around here
is mine” – this refrain from a famous
Soviet song from 1947 celebrates the
achievements of socialism and de-
scribes the situation after the revolu-
tion; at least formally it is not entirely
incorrect. The members of a kolkhoz,
in contrast to the workers on a state
farm, owned all the capital of their
farm in common except for the land
which was given to them for tempo-
rarily unlimited use. But when villag-
ers quote this sentence today, often
12 There are, of course, many reports of envy and
hostilities against the “Kulaks” whose sources of
income included trade and moneylending, but the-
se reports are often “heavily influenced” by socia-
list revolutionary or Soviet ideology. PERRIE (1990),
for example, argues that usually all socioeconomic
strata took part in the peasant movement of 1905
which was directed primarily against the landlords.
There were only “rare cases” where richer peasants
themselves became victims of the riots, in others
they “felt themselves to have more in common with
their fellow-villagers than with the landlord” (PERRIE
1990, p. 204). Here, as in general (ATKINSON 1990, p.
9), the crucial criteria for peasant’s sentiments about
“justice” seem to have been weather somebody
worked the land he owned himself or hired labour,
not weather one was “rich” or “poor”.
13 The time of Brezhnev’s leadership is, in Russia,
called “vremja zastoja,” the “time of the standstill”.
This section draws heavily on material that I coll-
ected during 18 months of fieldwork in Russian
villages between May 2000 and October 2001. I
wish to thank the German Research Foundation
for its generous support of this project.
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with a wink, it means that everything
that belongs to the collective farm can
be ‘used’ for personal auxiliary farm-
ing, borrowed in the best and stolen in
the worst case.
The double entendre of this sen-
tence sheds, in a symbolic way, a very
accurate light on the situation in the
collective farms. The introduction of
the kolkhoz system made a deep and
enduring inroad into the existing
social and economic order in the
villages. It represents the attempt to
break up their localised character, to
control them in a much more compre-
hensive way then had been the case
under feudalism, to integrate them
economically into the scheme of the
planned economy and to foster the
identification with the socialist nor-
mative system. But the fact that the
sentence “everything around here be-
longs to the kolkhoz, everything
around here is mine” could be quoted
with full pathos at any official occa-
sion as well as with a completely
different meaning among friends
makes clear that this attempt neither
succeeded entirely nor led to a real
amalgamation of the prerevolutionary
land communes with the new collec-
tive farms. Instead it established, We
would argue, a quite ambivalent rela-
tionship between the state, locally
represented by the kolkhoz, the vil-
lage community, and the private house-
holds. Cast now in the context of
privatisation, this relationship is often
called rural collectivism and egalitari-
anism.
This ambivalence was to a high
degree nurtured and maintained by
the sometimes antagonistic, but most-
ly symbiotic relationship between wage
labour on the collective farm and
personal auxiliary farming. After the
revolution personal auxiliary farming
as well as the collective farms were
considered a transitional phenomenon
that would, over the years, give way to
state property as the highest form of
property but by the time of Brezhnev,
attempts in this direction had already
been abandoned. Private life and a
private sphere, which ideally were also
to disappear in a socialist society had
now become uncontested elements of
the Soviet everyday life and constitut-
ed a powerful niche for the individual
(STUDER a. UNFRIED 1999, p. 108, fig.
4). What ZASLAVSKY (1982, p. 126)
calls the “historical compromise” of
the Brezhnev-era – abstention from
mass protests in exchange for stable
prices, zero unemployment, and mod-
est improvements in standards of
living – assumed on the collective
farms the shape of an informal tit for
tat. In spite of their miserable wages,
the workers showed up more or less
regularly at their workplaces and sold
part of their privately grown products
to the farms if they had problems
fulfilling the state delivery plans. In
return, they received various kinds of
support for their personal auxiliary
farming. This symbiosis existed in
principal on a fully legal basis: The
third “Model Collective Farm Char-
ter” (see BRUNNER a. WESTEN 1970),
which had been approved by the All-
union Congress of the Kolkhoz Farm-
ers on November 27, 1969, stated that
the collective farms had to support
the personal auxiliary farming of their
workers (art. 42), for instance by
helping them to buy cattle or supply-
ing them with pastures (art. 43). It
even allowed the distribution of land
to persons not employed by the farm
but living on its territory (teachers,
medical orderlies, employees of the
village administration …), which was
quite an important detail for the all-
inclusive territorial power of the
kolkhozes (art. 44). However, the
concrete shape of these arrangements
was rarely fixed in written form;
instead it was either negotiated be-
tween the collective of workers and
the farm management or agreed upon
individually. These agreements opened
up a huge arena for informal bargain-
ing where the interests of the workers
as farmers and of the chairman of the
farm as a state representative collided.
And the unofficial understanding of
“everything around here belongs to
the kolkhoz, everything around here
is mine” makes clear where the
workers had their priorities.
The parallel existence of two com-
pletely different but highly interde-
pendent and spatially intermingled
forms of production became one of
the crucial characteristics of Soviet
agriculture. The emergence of a re-
spectively divided public sphere was
its logical consequence. In a paradox-
ical way the mode of its formation
parallels on a micro level of villages
what has been described as the
establishment of a civil public sphere
in eighteenth- and nineteenth century
Western Europe (HABERMAS 1989).
Unlike city dwellers, the livelihood of
the kolkhozniks was still highly con-
tingent on the utilisation of their
private property, their small plot of
land, and the sale of their products at
more or less free prices in so-called
kolkhoz-markets. For this, they de-
pended heavily on the help of the
collective farm, and, as private pro-
ducers, they raised claims that often
tended to be ‘informal’ if not illegal.
This created a sphere, which We
would call “private-public”.14 It could
be found in the daily meetings of
neighbours and friends, mostly in the
kitchens of private houses and centred
around prices on the local market, the
availability of products on black mar-
kets, the compensation for having a
kolkhoz-tractor work on one’s private
plot of land or for borrowing a
chainsaw, or in the risk of getting
firewood from the nearby forest, etc.
Exchange of information as well as
reaching a consensus about many
crucial questions of the village life
were the functions of this private-
public sphere.
On the other hand, more closely
tied to the kolkhoz and in part to the
rural administration, an “official-pub-
lic sphere” was established in the
villages. This sphere mirrored the
integration of the village communities
into the political, economic, and ideo-
logical realm of the state. It had its
place in the general meetings of the
members of the kolkhoz and in
kolkhoz festivities as well as in the so-
called cultural centres, the village
chorus, and in the youth organisation
of the Communist Party. Of course,
this sphere served in part as an
instrument for the maintenance and
reproduction of state power, but it was
nevertheless not only for show but
was as “real” as the private-public
sphere. The nationwide Soviet cere-
monies, for example, on the 1st of
May had become as important a part
of everyday life as the orthodox
holidays, which were celebrated in
spite of all official attempts to sup-
14 We borrowed this term as well as “official-public
sphere” (see below) from OSWALD a. VORONKOV (2003),
although they use it with a slightly different mea-
ning in an urban context.
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press religion. Needless to say, the
official-public and the private-public
spheres were, in reality highly over-
lapping. It is much easier to separate
them analytically than in social prac-
tices, but, even so, both reflected
different, often contradictory, however
simultaneously valid standards of pow-
er and legitimacy.
But the collective farms in rural
areas were much more than sites of
production and supporting infrastruc-
ture for personal auxiliary farming.
They acted as comprehensive social
institutions – referring to GOFFMAN
(1972, p. 11), some even call them
“total institutions” (GAMBOLD MILLER
2001, p. 152; Max Planck Institute for
Social Anthropology 2001, p. 82, 127)
– that structured daily life on a
spatially defined field of responsibility.
The already mentioned third “Model
Collective Farm Charter” attributed
to them the duty to “improve the
living conditions in rural areas” by
building clubs, libraries, sport facili-
ties, and educational institutions, to
support the schools and kindergartens
with the education of the children, to
organise communal feeding, to back
the village ambulances and doctors, to
facilitate public transport and to care
for public infrastructure, such as streets,
electricity, gas, etc. (art. 41). This all-
embracing character of the kolkhoz –
it affected everybody living on its
territory and involved many facets of
everyday life – is responsible for the
fact that patterns of relationships,
which in urban environments usually
define far reaching social networks,
shaped in the countryside the charac-
ter of the local community as a
whole.15 Only in this way could it
become a true point of reference for
identification, determining the mean-
ing of “we” in rural environments.
The differences between the kolk-
hozes and the situation in the pre-
revolutionary land communes are ob-
vious: In fact, the villages were still
confronted with high demands from
outside, but they had lost their auton-
omy in meeting them. It was no
longer the collective of all households
that was held responsible for the
payment of taxes, the delivery of
products, and decisions about crop
rotation, but the chairman of the
collective farm as the local represen-
tative of the state. Not by accident,
chairmen were often posted from
other regions. Starting with them, all
kinds of demands and regulations
trickled down through a sophisticated
hierarchical system to each single
worker. Now the state was no longer
“outside” but had become present
within the community in everyday
interactions and was integrated even
into personal auxiliary farming insofar
as the ability to work one’s private
plot depended on the support of the
collective farms. What had been the
local public sphere represented by the
communal assembly and its elected
elder had split up into a state-bound
sphere of collective activities and a
sphere of representation of private
interests with differing standards of
legitimacy. Finally, practices of peas-
ant self-justice, which had so clearly
expressed the peasants’ poor integra-
tion into state structures, disappeared
during Soviet times.
“The notion of a Soviet cultural
tradition may seem peculiar – even
repugnant – to some. However, seven-
ty years of active cultural and eco-
nomic formation produced institution-
al forms particular (or particularly
adapted) to Soviet society” argues
ALLINA-PISANO (2003, p. 5). Especially
in rural areas, a specific normative
entanglement of “labour”, “income”,
“justice” and “authority” seems to me
to be a central part of that and raises
serious questions about the assump-
tion of a continuity of collectivism
and egalitarianism. On one of the now
restructured collective farms where I
worked, the chairman earns not only
approximately 20,000 $ a month, but
he also holds a position of uncontest-
ed authority on his territory. In a
patrimonial manner, he determines
the project for restructuring the former
kolkhoz into an agro-holding compa-
ny as well as the maintenance of the
infrastructure in the village, but he
also sets rules of behaviour in public
spaces, advises workers to clean their
private courtyards, or gives a loan to
one household but refuses it to
another. Driving around in his Lada
car, he once told me how much he
would like to have a big Toyota jeep
instead. When we asked him why he
did not just buy one, he answered:
“What would that look like – the
chairman of a kolkhoz in a Toyota
jeep? I bought one for my son who
lives in the city but I can’t show up
with a car like that here in the
village!”
This short statement illustrates that
it is less the highly unequal distribu-
tion of authoritative resources, than
the public display of wealth that the
chairman fears would really damage
his image: Less his arbitrary interfer-
ences into the private matters of his
workers, than the obvious fact that he
brings in more money than one could
earn with ‘honest’ labour. Being sub-
jected to strict hierarchies was an
integral part of the Soviet system and
hardly put into question; income,
however, was tied to a rather quantita-
tive understanding of “labour” and
“production” which would not allow
for a truly pronounced differentiation.
Even in pure theory, this did not mean
egalitarianism in the sense of equal
payments for everybody – “for good
work, for better results – higher
wages” states, for instance, the “Model
Collective Farm Charter” (art. 27). In
relative terms, ‘big’ socioeconomic
differences, which could be found in
each Soviet village, were usually
accepted as long as they were traced
back to hard work and abstinence
from drinking. However, it restricted
the corridor of socially accepted in-
come variations, and it is not by
accident that one of the most pejora-
tive denominations in the official
Soviet terminology – “speculator” –
stands for a person who earns money
without working.
Under the very peculiar circum-
stances that distinguished agricultural
production in the Russian countryside
in Soviet times, this specific linkage of
a “just income” with a quantitative
and easily comparable understanding
of labour was highly problematic and
influenced the character of the com-
munities as a whole. A substantial
share of the income of each house-
hold was the result of its personal
auxiliary farming activities for which
the preconditions were often set in
15 The existence of a local community and that kolk-
hoz workers were also private producers constitu-
te two preconditions for the origin of a public sphere
fundamentally different from the situation in urban
contexts. They are widely neglected in works dea-
ling with the topic of a public sphere in socialist
societies (see for example FOREST a. JOHNSON 2002;
GARCELON 1997; GRÜTZMACHER 2002; KHARKHORDIN 1995,
1997; OSWALD a. VORONKOV 2003; ROLF 2002; SCHLÖ-
GEL 1998; SHLAPENTOKH 1989; STUDER a. UNFRIED 1999).
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bilateral agreements, partly discussed
with others, but far from transparent
to everybody. This, to some extent,
hidden character of the individually
differing arrangements for personal
auxiliary farming, led to a compara-
tively high mistrust towards socioeco-
nomic differentiation in general: Who
knew for sure whether one’s fellow
villagers had perhaps been given
much more favourable conditions to
get what they needed for their houses
and ‘farms’? The reproduction and
stability of the private-public sphere
in the villages can, to a huge extent,
be traced back to exactly this perma-
nently felt lack of information.
The role of the collective farms was
thus highly ambivalent. On the one
hand, they were the core part of the
state structures, that had thoroughly
permeated and corroded the old
village communities and served as a
permanent mechanism of control. But
on the other, they were the decisive
local institution, which had the re-
sources at its disposal to act in nearly
all fields as a supporting infrastructure
for the interests of the villagers,
stretching from education for the
children, health care, and public trans-
port, to assistance for personal auxil-
iary farming and marriage celebra-
tions. That the representatives of the
collective farms lived in the villages,
had their own children in the village
schools, and were themselves depen-
dant on help for their plot of land
served to guarantee a real balancing
of their functions. The resulting posi-
tive feeling among villagers of being
tied together via the kolkhoz as a
localised welfare mechanism contrib-
uted substantially to the evolution of
a new kind of communal identity. One
might call this “collectivism”, but I
doubt that it can be interpreted as an
indicator for continuity.
Conclusion
It is all too obvious to blame collectiv-
ism and egalitarianism for the difficul-
ties encountered in the privatisation
and restructuring of the collective
farms in Russia. As key concepts of
socialist ideology, they are part of a
past that privatisation aims to over-
come. And, as the essence of a
century-old rural culture, they consti-
tute obstacles that can not be re-
moved overnight. As plausible as
these arguments are, it is necessary to
contextualise them by relating them
to concrete social practices and their
structural environment. Once we do
this, it seems to me, the image of
continuity that the transhistorical use
of the term evokes dissolves, and the
stereotype of collectivism becomes a
multitude of collectivisms, which are
not unified by a superordinated idea,
but differentiated by the figurations
and arrangements they depict. This is
not to neglect a certain degree of path
dependency in the actual develop-
ments in the Russian countryside, but
rather to call for searching for the
path on the ground instead of using
outdated, prerevolutionary maps or
never realised, Soviet sketches.
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